Why build the 2 mega-ferries?

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Why did the Société des Traversiers (STQ) decide to build two larger ferries at Tadoussac to replace the three current ones without prior analysis?

Illustration of a detective with a question mark

Over the last 18 years of work at the Société du Pont sur le Saguenay à Tadoussac (SPST), we have had only one opportunity to exchange views with representatives of the Société des Traversiers in order to understand how they justify their decision to build these big boats and where the urgency comes from. It was during the BAPE commission on the construction of a mooring dolphin at the Tadoussac lay-by wharf, which we requested along with other local organizations and citizens. It was held on November 8 and 9, 2016 and December 6 and 7, 2016 in Tadoussac, i.e. 7 years after the hasty decision of 2009.

*As extensive documentation accompanies these hearings and we have a transcript of the exchanges, we will refer to it to present a simplified version of the discussions.

First finding: the decision “came from above” — no justification

The justification of the Société des Traversiers came after the fact, since, as with the Ministry of Transport (MTQ), we learned at the hearings that no study, no prior analysis, no consultation of users or of the community was carried out before this decision was made. These hearings were the only opportunity, 7 years after the decision, for citizens, elected officials and the groups concerned to express themselves on this decision to replace the ferries before the end of their useful life. This information was obtained thanks to the openness of the Commission chair, who was nevertheless obliged to interrupt us several times to remind us that we were there to talk about building an additional mooring post (a dolphin) to secure the mooring of the new large vessel at rest at the lay-by wharf. Thus, even raising the subject of the ferries was in itself out of order; talking about the bridge was prohibited by the Commission’s restrictive mandate. Here nonetheless is what we learned at these hearings.

Who made the decision to build these boats?

The CEO of the STQ then confirmed to us that the decision was made at the Premier’s Office, at the latter’s request, during a meeting between the two men in March 2009. Two SPST representatives and the member for René-Lévesque met the CEO of the Société des Traversiers, Georges Farrah, after the announcement of the construction of the boats. This was 3 years after the preliminary version of the impact study on a bridge had been publicly discussed. (Re: meeting of February 10, 2010 at the office of the member Marjolain Dufour at the Québec legislature, attended by Mr. Jean-Guy Rousseau, President of the SPST, Mr. Pierre Breton, Vice-President of the SPST, Mr. Marjolain Dufour, member for René-Lévesque, and Georges Farrah, CEO of the Société des Traversiers du Québec)

On what basis was this decision made, and how will this decision improve the service?

Excerpt from an intervention by the Commission chair addressing the engineer-representatives of the following organizations represented:

1) MTQ, Capitale-Nationale territorial office,

2) MTQ, Côte-Nord territorial office, 3) at the STQ:

3) STQ, head office in Québec City

The chair of the BAPE Commission

“I dare to believe that it wasn’t suddenly someone who woke up one morning and said: ‘It’s going to be two bigger ferries’ or ‘It’s going to be bigger ferries’. So someone must have done an analysis somewhere, bridge versus status quo.”

Answer of the three participants: No, no analysis or anything else was carried out. Nothing other than the Minister’s announcements and the related speeches.

So NO, no one did an analysis… (see the transcripts of the sessions of the BAPE, DT1 page 42, lines 1612)

During the BAPE hearings, the commissioners could hardly believe that a decision of this importance had been made so cavalierly. They therefore questioned the STQ and MTQ representatives to ask them where the supporting documents were. Both confirmed the next day, after research, that there was no supporting document other than the text of the Minister’s announcement and the speech given on that occasion by the CEO of the STQ.

Answers of the MTQ and the STQ: (Dt2 pp. 4 to 6) NO, no document, no analysis available, no consultation other than the after-the-fact consultations of the STQ’s regional information committee, without the ins and outs of the project being precisely known

The “after-the-fact” justification arguments:

Better service at peak times, according to the STQ: True or False?

Concerning the efficiency of 2 large ferries compared to the 3 current ferries, here is an excerpt from the official transcript of the BAPE hearing of November 8, 2016 (File 334, Document Dt1, pp. 29 and 30).

Question from the Chair to the engineer Rochette of the STQ:

THE CHAIR: So you are telling us that two bigger ferries will then make it possible to carry more people at peak times — is that what we should understand?

THE ENGINEER: Exactly

THE CHAIR: So that’s why you justified… that’s how you justify bigger ferries? Especially at peak times, for example during the day, late morning for example…

THE ENGINEER: There was…

THE CHAIR: … or in summer?

THE ENGINEER: Yes, well, the answer I gave — I wouldn’t say that’s what justified the bigger ferries. It’s what explains why not smaller ferries with more frequency. The big ferries come from a service offer that the STQ wanted to provide. A greater service offer so as not to leave people on the wharf during crossings.

THE CHAIR: That’s it, so you consider that you are able to provide a greater service offer in time… most of the time, with two bigger ferries?

THE ENGINEER: Indeed

THE CHAIR: Is that how we should understand the answer?

THE ENGINEER: Indeed

Discussion of this exchange:

Of course, bigger boats carrying more vehicles seem to confirm the engineer’s assertion, but that is without counting the frequency of departures — another decisive element. On closer inspection, one finds on the contrary that the service during the periods when vehicles will be left on the wharf in summer will be lower. In fact, two 110-vehicle ferries will worsen the duration and extent of the backlogs of vehicles left on the wharf in the busiest period: summer. And it so happens that these peak periods, during which the ferries will perform less well, are precisely those that deter tourists from coming, or coming back, to the region.

These periods occur all year round but overwhelmingly during the summer peak season — a season during which 3 ferries are currently in service (from June 1 to September 3 in 2018): the Armand-Imbeau and the Jos-Deschênes, each with 75 vehicle spaces, and the Félix-Antoine-Savard with 70 vehicle spaces. The three boats can load an average of 73 vehicles. During the day in summer, the 3-boat service runs over a period of 8 hours every 13 minutes, as indicated in the Société des Traversiers’ official 2018 schedule, from June 1 to September 3.

So every hour of the peak period there are 4.62 departures (60 minutes / 13 minutes = 4.62) with 73.3 vehicles on board on average when vehicles are left on the wharf.

Current scenario

Hourly capacity during saturation of the current 3-boat service every 13 minutes:

4.62 departures × 73.3 veh. = 339 vehicles leave one wharf or the other every hour in busy periods.

Proposed scenario

If the 75-space ferries are replaced by 2 boats of 110 vehicle spaces each (i.e. a total of 220 vehicle spaces) crossing every 20 minutes, the number of vehicles leaving the wharves per hour in busy periods will be:

3 departures every 20 minutes per hour × 110 veh. = 330 vehicles will leave one wharf or the other every hour in busy periods.

Hence a 3% decrease in hourly capacity to clear the queues of vehicles during saturation of the service.

The STQ engineer’s argument that this is an improvement in the offer at peak times is not correct. The STQ’s notion of vehicles left on the wharf distorts the issue. This measure does not take into account the length of the queues, the number of vehicles in the queues, or the number of vehicles that turn back, abandon a trip or take a 105-kilometre detour via Ville de Saguenay. The deterrent effect of the backlogs is not measurable but has a definite impact on road safety, the competitiveness of our industries and the satisfaction of tourists, visitors and other users of Route 138 travelling between the region and the rest of the continent.

It may nevertheless be pointed out that in the 2009 Impact Study on the construction of the Tadoussac bridge, it was estimated that the mere presence of a bridge would increase traffic by 18 to 25%. These figures may also mean that the ferries deter 18 to 25% of potential users of Route 138 from travelling between the Côte-Nord–Labrador region and the rest of the continent.

Another argument put forward by the STQ to justify the big ferries after the fact:

We are increasing our crossing capacity from 330 to 440 vehicles per hour…

This argument is not credible. It is based on the presumption that there are 4 periods of 20 minutes in an hour. The reality is that there are only 3. Even though, after a day’s reflection, the STQ experts came back with a departure every 19 minutes to justify 4 departures per hour, this option is no more credible.

Another STQ argument to justify bigger ferries:

Offering much more space for crossing over a 24-hour period.

True and false

The big boats and the additional spaces made available will essentially be empty spaces in the evening and at night — spaces that will nevertheless have to be moved, with the related fuel and other costs. So these ferries will cost more to operate, with a mass increased by more than 30%, and will be less able to meet demand at peak times. By discharging platoons increased by 50% during saturation, they will induce exit platoons that are difficult to dissolve on an unsuitable road, with an increase in the already known risks to road safety, including the ferry syndrome. They will ensure the isolation of the region and contribute to the weaker competitiveness of North Shore businesses on international markets.

In light of this $400M mess to date, which will far exceed half a billion to adapt Route 138 to these behemoth ferries, the government will no doubt have to conclude that the Société des Traversiers is currently a free agent that spends public funds without restraint, without taking the elementary precaution of carrying out an analysis, consultations and modelling of the effects of its decision on citizens who use the road. Political decision takes the place of sound management decisions, which produces the chaos we know. Would it not be more relevant to privatize the Société des Traversiers and put in competition the companies wishing to offer the service, as is done elsewhere and even here, with tenders for the Îles-de-la-Madeleine ferry service?

The benefits presented by the Société des Traversiers are very slim compared to the aforementioned drawbacks and the expenditure of public funds they entail. A more economically advantageous, safer and long-term solution has long been known: A bridge, now!

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