When civil servants replace elected officials

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By letting the cart (civil servants) get ahead of the horse (elected officials), the MTQ ensures that Québec’s economy stalls.

A case study: the Tadoussac bridge

How the senior civil service protects its jobs ahead of the higher interests of Québec by deliberately distorting the information transmitted to elected officials, by failing to transmit vital information, or by demanding the impossible from the study makers.

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For decades, North Shore residents, on whom the Plan Nord relies, have been calling for a completed road so as to move from an extraction-and-shipping economy to a diversified economy of processing and exchange with neighbouring regions.

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The entrance to the region, at Tadoussac, is limited by a ferry service which, saturated, prevents, among other things, fluid and safe traffic on Route 138 and hence the economic and tourism diversification of the region. The Société des Traversiers du Québec operates at Tadoussac its largest crossing in Québec by number of vehicles carried. The entire Côte-Nord region, whose access depends on the crossing, has for decades been calling for a bridge over the Saguenay River. But here is the thing: the employees on the ferries are state civil servants, and the senior officials responsible for these employees — as we recently learned from the Deputy Minister, the head of the Ministry’s civil servants — “take no orders from the Minister”. In this context, it must be understood that senior officials who wish to protect jobs at the Tadoussac crossing can present biased information with impunity, despite a request from elected officials to compare the true operating costs of the ferries with the costs of a bridge. That is precisely what happened. Senior officials had the cost of a bridge overestimated threefold and the cost of the ferries underestimated by at least threefold. (See the comparative table of the studies in the studies tab). If elected officials are forced to make decisions on the basis of distorted information, major omissions and far-fetched demands from senior officials, how can we hope for the exercise of a healthy democracy in which citizens and their representatives, the elected officials, receive accurate information allowing optimal use of public funds to carry out projects of national interest?

Here, then, is the saga of the Tadoussac Bridge, starring the Québec Ministry of Transport, its Capitale-Nationale territorial division and its Côte-Nord territorial division, as well as the Société des Traversiers du Québec, also under the authority of the Minister of Transport.

The beginning of the story

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As early as 1973, a Harvard University graduate and Doctor of civil engineering presented a bridge project with the help of engineering firms internationally recognized in the construction of long suspension bridges, concluding that it would be more economical to build a bridge than to maintain a ferry service 365 days a year. Already this study noted the deterrent effect of the crossing on the diversification of the region’s economy. It clearly stated that the ferry service was regularly saturated despite the presence of three boats. The study also underlined the importance of a functional road to serve a region rich and enriching for Québec — especially since the Côte-Nord has no rail link connected to the continental network and is at the mercy of an air transport monopoly that also charges deterrent fares in the region.

The table was set to trigger the mechanisms for protecting the jobs of the civil servants at the crossing. In 1974, a Transport Québec engineer attempted to cast doubt on the parameters used by the international experts who, among other things, had just supervised the construction of the first long suspension bridge over the Bosphorus, in Istanbul, Turkey.

In 1976, the engineer Monti prepared a cost-benefit analysis showing that it is more advantageous to build a bridge, as part of a master’s thesis in economics he was preparing.

In 1977, the Minister of Transport, Lucien Lessard, commissioned a study on the Tadoussac Bridge from the engineering firm LGL. In 1978, LGL submitted a preliminary version of its study to the Ministry. It states that the Montréal and New York engineering firms that took part in the study conclude that bridge alignments in the Saguenay estuary, near the ferries among others, must be ruled out and that the optimal location for building the bridge is at the place known as La Boule, upstream of the Hydro-Québec lines.

From then on, a senior official commissioned a secret study to contradict these conclusions, without the knowledge of the minister himself. A young urban planner, who would be the first of her profession hired by the MTQ, was appointed to conduct this counter-study. From the outset, the objective was clear: to maintain MTQ jobs at the crossing by severely discrediting the Côte-Nord region. Since this document would be for internal use, anything goes. Apart from this urban planner, none of the 4 or 5 contributors to the drafting of the study saw fit to indicate their professional qualifications. Against all logic, one can read in it:

  1. That North Shore residents do not need a functional road because they are far away
  2. That they mostly travel by plane and that this mode of transport will be used more and more in the future (in 2016, a return plane ticket Baie-Comeau–Québec City costs $1,300), so the road is almost superfluous,
  3. That the waiting time at the crossing is ridiculously insignificant considering the 7 hours it takes to travel from Québec City to Baie-Comeau, etc.
  4. It omits to address the harm to road safety, the unpredictability of travel times, the reliability of the service, the periods of saturation of the service and the deterrent effect of ferries on a national highway.
  5. It does not hesitate, even though no engineer is identified among the authors of the study, to contradict the experts of the LGL study, the New York and Montréal engineering firms (Study 1979 A), and to decide that, even though the experts had determined the optimal location, the MTQ internally proposes an alignment near the ferries, roughly drawn on a falsified map, as the location favoured by the MTQ for building a bridge. This alignment would be the one which, against all expectations, would be selected and prioritized 20 years later by the MTQ in the subsequent studies of 1999 and 2009. The consequences of this secret study, in which almost anything could be said: the alignment roughly drawn on a map, with dubious measurements suggesting that the main span of the suspension bridge would be 1,200 metres, whereas subsequent studies would show that this distance actually varies from 1,350 metres to 1,420 metres. The objective was to suggest that if one day a bridge had to be built, building it near the ferries would not really be more costly than building it at La Boule, where the main span is 1,150 metres. Had an engineer used his title to present such a study, he would have had to explain before the Ordre des ingénieurs the sum of the errors in this study. By appointing an urban planner to do the exercise, the MTQ gave itself every latitude to assert anything without the appropriate expertise.

This is how we would end up with the pharaonic project presented in the 2009 impact study by the SNC-Lavalin/Génivar consortium — a dead end orchestrated by the civil servants.

We will come back to explain how, although all the information is already available on this site in the interactive table of the “studies” tab. Let us simply recall that the lack of diversification of the North Shore economy today (tourism; SMEs 200/100,000 inhabitants instead of 300/100,000 inhabitants in neighbouring regions, re: study on the sawn-lumber industry by the consultants J.P. Grenon) is directly related to the interventions of senior officials of the Ministry of Transport to protect their interests to the detriment of those of Québec.

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Let us hope that in 2017 a decision will be made by our elected representatives to restore the priority of national interests over special interests by commissioning an independent, objective and complete analysis of the real costs of the ferries compared to the real costs of a bridge. A bridge at Tadoussac must be built quickly. Maintaining the alienation of Québec’s economy and contributing for the next 45 years to the disappearance of the belugas is not an option, however sensitive we may be to maintaining a few dozen jobs at the crossing.

Common sense calls for the construction of a bridge now!

Happy New Year 2017 to all,
Health and happiness to each of you

The team of La Société du Pont sur le Saguenay à Tadoussac

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